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High Time for Change: The
Legalization of Marijuana and Its
Impact on Warrantless Roadside
Motor Vehicle Searches
Molly E. O’Connell*
Abstract
The proliferation of marijuana legalization has changed the
relationship between driving and marijuana use. While
impaired driving remains illegal, marijuana use that does not
result in impairment is not a bar to operating a motor vehicle.
Scientists have yet to find a reliable way for law enforcement
officers to make this distinction. In the marijuana impairment
context, there is not a scientifically proven equivalent to the Blood
Alcohol Content standard nor are there reliable roadside
assessments. This scientific and technological void has
problematic consequences for marijuana users that get behind
the wheel and find themselves suspected of impaired driving.
Without a marijuana breathalyzer or reliable Field Sobriety
Tests, law enforcement officers are forced to find another way to
determine impairment. Searching the vehicle for evidence of
recent marijuana use can be an attractive option. However, the
Fourth Amendment prohibits “search first, find probable cause
later” policing. A roadside vehicle search violates a driver’s
* J.D. Candidate, Washington and Lee University School of Law; B.A.,
Georgetown University. Thank you to my Note Advisor, Professor John D.
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grateful to my parents and to my fiancé for their unwavering encouragement
and support. Special thanks to the Honorable Timothy S. Hillman, whose
insight provided the inspiration for this Note.
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Fourth Amendment rights if sufficient evidence of impairment is
lacking. Until law enforcement can reliably determine
marijuana impairment at the roadside, drivers need protection
from these unconstitutional searches. This Note addresses how
states can disincentivize potential Fourth Amendment
violations.
To provide context for this discussion, this Note begins by
outlining the history of marijuana’s legal status and
summarizing the relevant Fourth Amendment case law. Next, it
contrasts the challenges of determining marijuana impairment
with the relative ease of testing for alcohol impairment during
motor vehicle stops. This Note then presents case studies of three
states that each have a distinct legal approach to determining
marijuana impairment amongst drivers. Finally, this Note
provides prescriptive recommendations for states that have
legalized or plan to legalize marijuana. Ultimately, this Note
provides the reader with a primer on an important legal issue:
how the inability to reliably establish marijuana impairment
during a traffic stop creates an incentive for the police to search
the vehicle first and find probable cause later.
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INTRODUCTION
Since 2012, eighteen states and the District of Columbia
have legalized marijuana for adults over the age of twenty-one.1
Additionally, medical marijuana is legal in thirty-seven states.2
While many Americans now have access to marijuana, operating
a motor vehicle while impaired by marijuana remains illegal in
every state.3 However, a 2019 report by the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (“CDC”) revealed that approximately
twelve million (4.7 percent) Americans reported driving under

1. Jeremy Berke et al., Marijuana Legalization is Sweeping the US. See
Every State Where Cannabis is Legal, BUS. INSIDER (July 9, 2021, 9:20 AM),
https://perma.cc/2HCR-87ZQ.
2. Id.
3. Drugged Driving: Marijuana Impaired Driving, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE
LEGISLATURES (July 20, 2021), https://perma.cc/VJK7-MZH3.
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the influence of marijuana.4 In 2020, a survey conducted by
Mothers Against Drunk Driving found that number to be even
higher.5 According to the survey results, 12 percent of
respondents admit to having driven within two hours of
consuming marijuana.6 Despite the prevalence of driving under
the influence of marijuana, there is no reliable way to identify
whether a driver is impaired by marijuana. To identify a drunk
driver, police rely on Blood Alcohol Concentration standards
(“BAC”) and roadside assessments specifically designed to test
for alcohol impairment.7 Yet, when it comes to determining
marijuana impairment, there is no scientifically-proven
BAC-equivalent standard and no reliable roadside assessments
on which police can rely.8
During a traffic stop, the inability to determine whether a
driver is impaired by marijuana creates an incentive to search
the vehicle for evidence of recent marijuana use. However, a
police officer’s suspicions alone do not establish the probable
cause required to support a warrantless search.9 Thus, a
roadside vehicle search constitutes a violation of the driver’s
Fourth Amendment right if the police officer lacks sufficient
evidence demonstrating the driver is impaired. This Note will
address how states can protect the Fourth Amendment rights of
drivers suspected of operating under the influence of marijuana
in the absence of technology and assessments that can reliably
determine marijuana impairment at the roadside.
To provide context for this discussion, Part I of this Note
offers a history of the legal status of marijuana in the United
4. Alejandro Azofeifa et al., Driving Under the Influence of Marijuana
and Illicit Drugs Among Persons Aged ≥16 Years—United States, 2018, 68
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY.
REP. 1153, 1153 (2019).
5. See The Cannabis Report: America’s Perception on Consumption &
Road Risk, MOTHERS AGAINST DRUNK DRIVING (Sept. 10, 2020),
https://perma.cc/PG4E-KGXK
(detailing the results from a survey of a random sample of 1,020 adults,
eighteen years of age and older, from across the United States).
6. Id.
7. Drugged Driving, supra note 3.
8. Id.; see infra Part 0.
9. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158–59 (1925) (holding
that a police officer must have “reasonable cause” to believe an automobile
contains evidence of illegal activity to justify a warrantless search).
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States.10 Part I traces both federal marijuana prohibition11 and
state legalization efforts.12 Part II summarizes the Fourth
Amendment case law relevant to roadside motor vehicle
searches, focusing on the Supreme Court’s decision in Carroll v.
United States13 that established the automobile exception.14
Part III contrasts the challenges of determining marijuana
impairment with the relative ease of testing for alcohol
impairment during motor vehicle stops.15 Part III concludes by
reiterating the crux of the problem this Note seeks to address—
that the inability to reliably establish impairment during a
traffic stop creates an incentive for police to search the vehicle
first and find probable cause later.16 Part IV presents three
state-based case studies.17 The selected states, Washington,
Massachusetts, and Virginia, have all legalized marijuana, but
each offers a distinct legal approach to determining marijuana
impairment amongst drivers.18 Lastly, Part V will provide
prescriptive recommendations. First, Part V will address
scientific research aimed at determining marijuana impairment
and will advocate for further funding of such studies.19 Second,
Part V will discuss how states can protect drivers’ Fourth
Amendment rights in the absence of a reliable method of
determining marijuana impairment.20 Specifically, Part V will
advocate for repealing per se marijuana driving under the
influence (“DUI”) laws and for the legislative enactment of
probable cause-related protections for drivers.21

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

See infra Part 0.
See infra Parts 0–0.
See infra Part 0.
267 U.S. 132 (1925).
See infra Part 0.
See infra Part 0.
See infra Part 0.
See infra Part 0.
Id.
See infra Parts 0–0.
See infra Part 0.
Id.
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THE LEGAL STATUS OF MARIJUANA IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Initial Prohibition and Criminalization

In the United States, prohibition and criminalization of
marijuana began in the first half of the twentieth century.22
During this period, marijuana use was restricted at both the
state and the federal level.23 Initially, the federal government
relied on taxation to control and regulate the use of marijuana
and other drugs.24 The first measure of this kind was the
Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914,25 which imposed taxation
requirements on importers, manufacturers, and distributors of
drugs, including marijuana.26 Following the passage of the
Harrison Act, twenty-six states also enacted laws regulating
22. See Stephen Siff, The Illegalization of Marijuana: A Brief History,
ORIGINS (May 2014), https://perma.cc/68LG-TAR3

While there were fads for cannabis across the
nineteenth century, strictly recreational use was not
widely known or accepted. . . . [T]he practice of smoking
marijuana leaf in cigarettes or pipes was largely
unknown in the United States until it was introduced
by Mexican immigrants during the first few decades of
the twentieth century.
23. See id. (discussing the enactment of state-level marijuana laws that
were largely “uncontroversial and passed, for the most part, with an absence
of public outcry or even legislative debate”); see also Scott C. Martin, A Brief
History of Marijuana Law in America, TIME (Apr. 20, 2016),
https://perma.cc/TE8G-YAES (discussing Congress’s enactment of taxation
measures that effectively outlawed possession or sale of marijuana).
24. LISA N. SACCO, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43749, DRUG ENFORCEMENT IN
THE UNITED STATES: HISTORY, POLICY, AND TRENDS 2 (2014); see also Martin,
supra note 23 (“Congress deemed an act taxing and regulating drugs, rather
than prohibiting them, less susceptible to legal challenge.”).
25. Pub. L. No. 63-223, 38 Stat. 785 (replaced by the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236
(codified at 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq.)).
26. See SACCO, supra note 24, at 2–3 (describing the Harrison Act’s
mandates and impacts). Under the Harrison Act, drug importers,
manufacturers, and distributors were required to register with the U.S.
Department of Treasury, pay a tax on the drugs, and record each drug
transaction in which they engaged. Id. The Act was used to arrest, prosecute,
and jail physicians and to close state and city narcotics clinics. Id. at 3. Fearing
these legal consequences, physicians ultimately stopped prescribing drugs
regulated by the Harrison Act. Id.
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marijuana.27 While these restrictions had the effect of sending
most drug users to the black market,28 the growth and use of
marijuana remained legal until 1937.29
The passage of the federal Marijuana Tax Act of 193730
(“MTA”) marked a significant shift in the legal status of
marijuana.31 The MTA required that a “high-cost transfer tax
stamp” accompany every sale of marijuana.32 However, the
federal government largely refused to issue these stamps.33 The
result was an unofficial federal ban on marijuana.34 State
legislatures quickly followed suit, formally banning possession
of marijuana.35 These restrictions on marijuana were largely
uncontroversial at the time of their enactment and remained so
through the 1950s.36 Neither the government nor the media
bothered to distinguish between varying types of illegal drugs37
and Congress continued to pass legislation controlling and

27. See Siff, supra note 22 (“[B]etween 1914 and 1925, twenty-six states
passed laws prohibiting the plant.”).
28. See SACCO, supra note 24, at 3 (describing how the Harrison Act, by
discouraging physicians from prescribing covered drugs, had the effect of
driving drug users to the black market to seek out these substances).
29. See id. (discussing marijuana’s legal status at both the state and
federal level prior to further Congressional action that took place in 1937).
30. Pub. L. No. 75-238, 50 Stat. 551, invalidated by Leary v. United
States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969) and repealed by Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified at
21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq.).
31. See SACCO, supra note 24, at 3 (describing how the supporters of
increased federal controls on marijuana characterized drug users as the root
of criminal activity in the United States).
32. Id. at 4.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See id. (“Shortly after passage of the MTA, all states made the
possession of marijuana
illegal.”).
36. See Siff, supra note 22 (“The 1937 Marijuana Tax Act, which
regulated the drug by requiring dealers to pay a transfer tax, passed in the
House after less than a half-hour of debate and received only cursory attention
in the press. House members seem not to have known a great deal about the
drug.”).
37. See id. (“[L]awmakers and journalists seemed to have little patience
or interest for fine distinctions among illegal drugs. Heroin, cocaine, or
marijuana were all ‘dope’: dangerous, addicting, frightening, and bad.”).
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criminalizing drug use.38 For example, the Boggs Act,39 enacted
in 1951, included marijuana offenses among the drug crimes
that it subjected to stiff mandatory sentences.40
B. Changing Attitudes Met with Stagnant Federal Policies
Views towards drugs began to change in the mid-1960s as
marijuana use on college campuses proliferated.41 With
marijuana becoming increasingly common among the “best and
brightest” of America’s youth, attitudes soured toward the harsh
criminal penalties marijuana use carried.42 However, despite
this cultural shift, state-level arrests for marijuana offenses
increased dramatically between 1965 and 1970.43 Action at the
federal level was also out of sync with the increasing acceptance
of marijuana use.44 In 1970, Congress enacted the Controlled
Substances Act45 (“CSA”), which was designed to “replace
previous federal drug laws with a single comprehensive
statute.”46 The CSA created a system of five schedules under
which controlled substances were classified.47 Under the CSA,

38. SACCO, supra note 24, at 4.
39. Pub. L. 82-225, 65 Stat. 767 (repealed 1970).
40. See Martin, supra note 23 (describing the shift in federal laws from
those that used taxation and regulation to prohibit marijuana to the more
stringent measures that imposed sentencing requirements for
marijuana-related offenses).
41. See Siff, supra note 22 (discussing the media attention surrounding
“a new type of marijuana smoker: college students”).
42. See id. (“In 1967, not only hippie activists but the solidly mainstream
voices of Life, Newsweek, and Look magazines questioned why the [marijuana]
plant was illegal at all.”).
43. See id. (discussing the tenfold increase in marijuana arrests that
occurred at the state level in the later part of the 1960s).
44. See id. (describing the anti-marijuana actions of the Nixon
Administration despite growing public support for decriminalizing possession
of small amounts of marijuana).
45. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub.
L. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq.).
46. See SACCO, supra note 24, at 5.
47. See id. (describing the factors used to assign a controlled substance to
one of the five schedules). Controlled substances were evaluated in terms of
“(1) how dangerous they are
considered to be, (2) their potential for abuse and addiction, and (3) whether
they have legitimate medical use.” Id.
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Schedule I substances are the most restricted.48 Marijuana,
heroin, and LSD were all classified as a Schedule I substances.49
That designation legally defined marijuana as medically useless
and subjected it to the heaviest range of criminal penalties.50
Despite its Schedule I status, support for the
decriminalization of marijuana continued to grow during the
late 1970s.51 By 1977, President Jimmy Carter had publicly
called for the decriminalization of marijuana, arguing that
“anti-marijuana laws cause[d] more harm to marijuana users
than the drug itself.”52 However, these increasingly favorable
sentiments toward marijuana use did not translate into
legislative action at the federal level. Elected in 1980, President
Reagan maintained the anti-decriminalization stance he
adopted as governor of California and launched an extensive
anti-drug media campaign.53 Following President Reagan’s lead,
Congress passed three significant pieces of anti-drug legislation
during the 1980s.54 Each law was successively more punitive,
further entrenching the federal government’s anti-marijuana
stance.55
48. Id.
49. See Martin, supra note 23 (“Schedule 1, the most restrictive category,
contained drugs that the federal government deemed as having no valid
medical uses and a high potential for abuse. Part of Richard Nixon’s war on
drugs, the Controlled Substances Act placed cannabis into Schedule 1 . . . .”).
50. See id. (“The Schedule I designation made it difficult even for
physicians or scientists to procure marijuana for research studies.”); see also
SACCO, supra note 24, at 6–7 (discussing the Drug Enforcement
Administration’s (DEA) creation and CSA enforcement authority).
51. See id. (“[T]here was a growing consensus that criminal punishments
for pot were contrary to the public interest; and medical and legal authorities
were disputing the logic of harsh anti-marijuana laws.”).
52. Id.
53. See id. (describing President Reagan’s opposition to drug use and
perceived “lack of sympathy” for drug users).
54. See id. (discussing how the anti-drug legislation of the 1980s was
largely motivated by fears over crack cocaine, but nonetheless, continued to
punish marijuana use because of its CSA Schedule I status).
55. Siff, supra note 22; see SACCO, supra note 24, at 7 (describing the
sharp rise in the number of drug convictions during the 1980s). In 1984,
Congress passed the Crime Control Act, which enhanced penalties for CSA
violations. Id. at 8. Two years later, Congress enacted the Anti-Drug Abuse
Act of 1986, most well-known for establishing mandatory minimum penalties
for drug trafficking offenses. Id. at 9. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 quickly
followed. Id. It created additional criminal penalties for CSA violations on
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In the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, both the Bush
Administration and the Clinton Administration maintained the
federal government’s firmly anti-drug position.56 Ending the
“scourge of drugs” was part of then-Vice President Bush’s
platform in his successful 1988 campaign for the Presidency.57
Upon taking office, President Bush further highlighted the
issue, devoting his first prime-time Oval Office speech to his
anti-drug program.58 Shortly after that address, “64 percent of
respondents in a New York Times/CBS News poll identified
drugs as the single most pressing issue facing the nation.”59
President Clinton, despite having admitted to smoking
marijuana,60 continued to warn the public about the threat of
drug use and pledged to fight its proliferation.61 President
Clinton even appointed a drug czar, who from 1998 to 1999 led
an expensive effort to incorporate anti-drug messages into prime
time television shows.62 Despite these efforts, President Clinton

federal property and established mandatory minimum penalties for drug
offenses involving minors. Id.
56. See Siff, supra note 22 (describing the anti-drug stances held by both
the Bush and Clinton Administrations).
57. See id. (stating that even with government surveys showing drug use
had declined during the Reagan Administration, President Bush still opted to
incorporate antidrug rhetoric into his campaign).
58. See Michael Isikoff, Drug Buy Set Up for Bush Speech: DEA Lured
Seller to Lafayette Park, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 1989, at A01 (describing the
preparation for the speech in which President Bush unveiled his anti-drug
program). To help the President illustrate how widespread the drug trade had
become, White House Communications Director, David Demarest, worked
with the Justice Department and the Drug Enforcement Administration
(“DEA”) to arrange an undercover drug buy. Id. DEA agents met a suspected
Washington, D.C. drug dealer in Lafayette Park, located just outside the White
House, in advance of the President’s speech. Id. The agents purchased crack
cocaine from the suspect and four days later, the President held up a bag of
the “white chunky substance in his Sept. 5 speech on drug policy.” Id.
59. Siff, supra note 22.
60. See id. (describing how President Clinton, in making this admission,
was careful to clarify that he did not “inhale”).
61. See id. (detailing President Clinton’s “undying effort” to fight against
drug use and suggesting that this position was the most politically strategic
option at the time).
62. See id. (“Clinton’s drug czar, Barry McCaffery, paid out $25 million to
five major television networks for writing anti-drug messages into specific
prime-time shows, with the White House reviewing and signing off on scripts
in advance.”).
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ultimately changed his stance, and indicated support for
decriminalizing marijuana use a month before he left office.63
If President Clinton’s eleventh-hour admission represented
progress for marijuana at the federal level, that progress was
fleeting. Clinton’s successor, President George W. Bush, took
office in 2001 and devoted additional money and resources to the
war on drugs.64 John Walters, President Bush’s drug czar,
largely focused his efforts on marijuana, making student drug
testing a major tenet of the Administration’s anti-drug policy.65
C. First Signs of Federal Progress
Ultimately, it was the Obama Administration that first
acknowledged the disparity between the federal government’s
marijuana policies and progress that was happening at the state
level.66 In 2009, President Obama’s Justice Department issued
a memo encouraging federal prosecutors not to prosecute
distribution of medical marijuana done in accordance with state
law.67 In 2013, following decisions by Colorado and Washington

63. See Jann S. Wenner, Bill Clinton: The Rolling Stone Interview,
ROLLING STONE (Dec. 28, 2000, 12:00 PM), https://perma.cc/Z3XY-KB2C
(quoting the President in response to a question regarding whether criminal
punishment is appropriate for possessing, using, or selling small amounts of
marijuana). After being assured that the interview would not be published
until after the 2000 election, President Clinton told Rolling Stone magazine
that he supported marijuana decriminalization and advocated for a
reexamination of the government’s drug incarceration policies. Id.
64. See A History of the Drug War, DRUG POL’Y ALL.,
https://perma.cc/LF57-TXSD (characterizing the drug was as “running out of
steam” when George W. Bush arrived in the White House but noting that the
President “allocated more money than ever to it”).
65. See id. (describing Walters’ anti-marijuana efforts as “zealous”
despite state-level reforms beginning to slow the federal government’s war on
drugs).
66. See infra Part 0 (summarizing the marijuana legalization at the state
level).
67.
See TODD GARVEY ET AL., CONG. RSCH SERV., R43435, MARIJUANA:
MEDICAL AND RETAIL — SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES 15 (2015) (discussing the 2009
Ogden Memorandum, issued by Obama Administration Deputy Attorney
General David W. Ogden, which directed federal prosecutors not to focus
federal resources “on individuals whose actions are in clear and unambiguous
compliance with existing state laws providing for the medical use of
marijuana” (citing U.S. Dep’t of Just., Memorandum for Selected U.S.
Attorneys from David W. Ogden, Deputy Attorney General, Investigations and
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to legalize recreational use of marijuana, the Obama Justice
That
Department
issued
the
Cole
Memorandum.68
memorandum announced that the federal government would
not pursue legal challenges against states that authorized
marijuana use, assuming state governments established strict
regulatory and enforcement mechanisms.69
In 2018, the Trump Administration rescinded the 2013 Cole
Memorandum.70 Then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions directed
federal prosecutors to enforce existing federal laws relating to
marijuana activities.71 This regression was short lived. Four
months after Sessions’ recission of the 2013 Cole Memorandum,
President Trump reversed course.72 Facing political pressure,
the President made a commitment that his Administration
would not interfere with the marijuana industry in states where
marijuana use was legal.73

Prosecutions in States Authorizing the Medical Use of Marijuana (Oct. 19,
2009), https://perma.cc/4SYT-P7ZU [hereinafter Ogden Memorandum])).
68. See id. at 17 (describing the August 2013 memo, issued by Deputy
Attorney General James M. Cole, as the “Obama Administration’s official
response to the Colorado and Washington initiatives”).
69. See id. (discussing the expectation established by the Obama Justice
Department in the Cole Memorandum that states control the “cultivation,
distribution, sale, and possession” of marijuana in a way that limits public
safety and public health risks (citing U.S. Dep’t of Just., Memorandum for U.S.
Attorneys from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney General, Guidance Regarding
Marijuana Enforcement (Aug. 29, 2013), https://perma.cc/466E-GNSN
(hereinafter [2013 Cole Memorandum])).
70. State Medical Marijuana Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES
(Jan. 1, 2022), https://perma.cc/DY45-RDUR (discussing California’s
enactment of Proposition 215).
71. See U.S. Dep’t of Just., Memorandum for U.S. Attorneys from
Jefferson B. Sessions, III, Attorney General, Marijuana Enforcement (Jan. 4,
2018), https://perma.cc/3KH2-SZ39 (encouraging federal prosecutors, in
deciding whether to prosecute marijuana-related cases, to “weigh all relevant
considerations, including federal law enforcement priorities set by the
Attorney General, the seriousness of the crime, the deterrent effect of criminal
prosecution, and the cumulative impact of particular crimes on the
community”).
72. See Evan Halper, Trump Administration Abandons Crackdown on
Legal Marijuana, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2018), https://perma.cc/9ZUD-N52Q
(describing President Trump’s decision to abandon a “Justice Department
threat to crack down on recreational marijuana in states where it is legal”).
73. See id.
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D. Current Federal Status
Today, marijuana remains classified as a Schedule I
substance under the CSA.74 Accordingly, distribution of
marijuana remains a federal offense.75 The Biden
Administration has not formally reinstated the policy outlined
in the 2013 Cole Memorandum. However, Attorney General
Merrick Garland has expressed support for limiting
prosecutions, indicating that the initial Obama-era policy
effectively remains in place.76 Although the policies underlying
the Ogden and Cole Memorandums do indicate progress at the
federal level, that progress is purely reactionary. While federal
protections for marijuana users have remained largely stuck in
the 1970s, at the state level, marijuana use has been trending
towards legalization since the 1980s.77
E. Legalization at the State Level
In the 1980s and 1990s, while both the White House and
Congress continued to obstruct a more favorable legal status for
marijuana,78 a divergence developed between the federal

President Trump personally directed the abrupt retreat,
which came at the behest of Republican Sen. Cory
Gardner of Colorado. . . . Gardner was incensed in
January when the Justice Department announced that
it was rescinding an Obama-era policy that directed
federal prosecutors not to target marijuana businesses
that operate legally under state law. The senator had
blocked Justice Department nominees in retaliation.
74. State Medical Marijuana Laws, supra note 70.
75. Id.
76. During testimony in front of the House Appropriations Committee’s
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies, Garland
stated that “the department’s view on marijuana use is that enforcement
against use is not a good use of our resources.” Garland went on to testify that
“it’s probably not a good use of our resources where [marijuana] is regulated
by the state.” House Appropriations Committee, Fiscal Year 2022 Budget
Request for the Department of Justice, YOUTUBE (May 4, 2021),
https://perma.cc/7EHA-JGYJ.
77. See infra Part 0 (summarizing the marijuana legalization at the state
level).
78. See supra notes 56–62 and accompanying text.

132

80 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 119 (2022)

government and numerous state governments.79 Over the last
three decades, states have deviated from the strict federal
restrictions on marijuana by enacting new laws and policies
permitting marijuana’s use.80 These initiatives can generally be
divided into three categories: those permitting marijuana use
for medical purposes, those decriminalizing marijuana, and
those legalizing marijuana’s recreational use.81
1.

Medical Use

In 1996, California became the first state to permit legal
access to and use of marijuana for medical purposes under
physician supervision.82 Today, thirty-six states, the District of
Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands have
approved “comprehensive, publicly available medical marijuana
programs.”83 While there is significant variation among states
regarding enforcement of medical marijuana laws, state
medical-use statues generally follow a standardized pattern.84
Influenced largely by the CSA and the Ninth Circuit’s decision
in Conant v. Walters,85 state medical marijuana laws are not
predicated on a doctor’s prescription.86 Rather, the state
statutory schemes rest on a doctor’s recommendation87 and

79. See Martin, supra note 23 (juxtaposing the federal government’s
categorization of marijuana as a medically useless, Schedule I substance with
the essentially simultaneous emergence of medical marijuana at the state
level).
80. SACCO, supra note 24, at 14–15.
81. Id. at 15.
82. See State Medical Marijuana Laws, supra note 70 (discussing
California’s enactment of Proposition 215).
83. Id.
84. GARVEY, supra note 67, at 8.
85. 309 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 2002). In Conant, “a California physician,
sought to enjoin the federal government from revoking his authority to
prescribe controlled substances at all in retaliation for his recommending
marijuana to some of his patients.” GARVEY, supra note 67, at 8. The Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court’s order enjoining a DEA enforcement action,
holding that the First Amendment protected a physician’s right to recommend
medical marijuana to patients. Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 639 (9th Cir.
2002).
86. GARVEY, supra note 67, at 9.
87. Id. State laws permit physicians to recommend medical marijuana
only to patients suffering at least one statutorily defined “debilitating” or
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require that the medicinal marijuana be dispensed at a location
other than a pharmacy.88 The laws also protect registered
“patients, care givers, cultivators, and distributors” from
criminal prosecution.89 Further, most states restrict the amount
of marijuana that a person may possess for medical purposes
and prohibit patients from using marijuana in public.90
2.

Decriminalization

Typically, decriminalization of marijuana means that “no
arrest, prison time, or criminal record will result from first-time
possession of a small amount of marijuana for personal
consumption.”91 In 1973, Oregon became the first state to
decriminalize marijuana possession, reclassifying the offense as
a civil violation punishable by a fine.92 Ten other states also
decriminalized marijuana possession in some fashion in the
1970s.93 However, in 1979, the decriminalization movement
came to an abrupt halt, with more than a dozen state
legislatures introducing decriminalization bills, but none
becoming law.94 Marijuana decriminalization remained stalled
for the next twenty years as an increase in drug enforcement
resources led to heightened enforcement of marijuana
prohibitions.95 In 2001, Nevada became the first since Nebraska,

“qualifying” medical condition. Id. The list of qualifying conditions typically
includes a broad, catchall condition such as “severe pain” or “chronic pain.” Id.
88. Id. While some state medical marijuana laws only allow the patient
or the patient’s caregiver to cultivate marijuana, most states have established
a regulatory scheme for medical marijuana dispensaries. Id. at 10.
89. Id. at 9.
90. See id. at 10 (“The limit is usually an amount less than three
ounces.”).
91. Decriminalization, NORML, https://perma.cc/43HF-NRFM.
92. Wayne A. Logan, After the Cheering Stopped: Decriminalization and
Legalism’s Limits, 24 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 319, 324–25 (2014).
93. See id. at 325 (identifying Colorado, Alaska, Ohio, California, Maine,
Minnesota, Mississippi, North Carolina, New York, and Nebraska as the ten
states that decriminalized marijuana possession in the 1970s). Colorado,
Alaska, Ohio, and California all decriminalized in 1975. Id. Maine and
Minnesota followed suit in 1976, Mississippi, North Carolina, and New York
in 1977, and Nebraska in 1978. Id.
94. Id.
95. See id. (explaining that the growth of cocaine in the 1980s “prompt[ed]
a dramatic infusion of resources for drug enforcement, which as cocaine
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which had decriminalized marijuana in 1978, to enact a
By
2014,
Massachusetts,
decriminalization
statute.96
Connecticut, Rhode Island, Vermont, Maryland, and the District
of Columbia had also decriminalized marijuana possession.97
Currently, twenty-seven states have either fully or partially
decriminalized certain marijuana possession offenses.98
Generally, in these states, small, personal-consumption
amounts of marijuana warrant only a civil infraction or the
lowest misdemeanor, which carries no possibility of jail time.99
3.

Recreational Use

States began to legalize recreational use of marijuana in
2012.100 As of October 2021, eighteen states, along with the

receded, resulted in a rededication of attention to enforcing marijuana
prohibition”).
96. See id. (describing Nevada’s decision to decriminalize marijuana as
evidence that the “decriminalization pendulum ha[d] swung back the other
way”); see also supra note 93 and accompanying text (discussing Nebraska’s
decriminalization of marijuana).
97. See id. at 325–26

In 2008, 65% of Massachusetts voters backed the
“Massachusetts Sensible Marijuana Policy Initiative,”
which changed simple marijuana possession from a
misdemeanor to a “civil offense.” In 2011, Connecticut’s
decriminalization statute went into effect; in 2013
Rhode
Island
and
Vermont
both
became
decriminalization jurisdictions; and Maryland and the
District of Columbia (pending congressional approval)
joined the ranks in 2014.
98. See Decriminalization, supra note 91 (listing the states that have
decriminalized marijuana in some fashion and discussing how in those states,
marijuana possession is treated like minor traffic violations). Localities have
also enacted decriminalization measures. See Logan, supra note 92, at 326 (“In
Chicago, for instance, a city in which police made over 33,000 marijuana
possession arrests in 2010, the city council in 2012 voted overwhelmingly (43–
3) to have police ticket but not arrest individuals who possess less than fifteen
grams of marijuana, making it a fine-only offense.”).
99. See Cannabis Overview, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (July 6,
2021), https://perma.cc/S58U-T2WW (outlining a range of state
decriminalization enactments).
100. See Casey Leins et al., States Where Recreational Marijuana is Legal,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Oct. 14, 2021), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-
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District of Columbia and Guam, have legalized recreational
marijuana.101 In general, recreational use laws regulate the
quantity of marijuana a person can possess and the number of
marijuana plants that can be grown at home.102 Many states
also differentiate between the permissible amount of marijuana
and the permissible amount of “concentrated marijuana”103 that
a person can possess.104 In all states that permit recreational
use, only adults over the age of twenty-one are allowed to
possess and grow marijuana.105
II.

has

THE LAW REGARDING WARRANTLESS ROADSIDE MOTOR
VEHICLE SEARCHES

The proliferation of marijuana legalization at the state level
given rise to numerous constitutional concerns.

states/slideshows/where-is-pot-legal (discussing legalization of recreational
use of marijuana in Colorado and Washington in 2012), https://archive.ph/uFWxu.
101. Id.
102. See id. (summarizing the guidelines in each of the eighteen states that
have legalized marijuana for recreational use). In Colorado, Washington,
Oregon, Nevada, Vermont, and Virginia, a person can possess up to one ounce
of marijuana. Id. Connecticut and New Mexico legalized slightly higher
amounts, 1.5 ounces and two ounces, respectively. Id. Maine and Michigan
permit possession of up to 2.5 ounces. Id. New York allows a person to possess
three ounces of marijuana. Id. In Massachusetts, a person can keep up to ten
ounces of marijuana in their home, but any quantity greater than one ounce
must be secured in a locked container. Id. Most recreational use states,
including Colorado, Alaska, Oregon, California, Maine, Massachusetts, and
Vermont, permit six marijuana plants per household. Id. However, Virginia
only allows four marijuana plants to be grown at home, while Nevada,
Michigan, and New Mexico allow up to twelve plants. Id.
103. Concentrated marijuana contains higher levels of THC than the
marijuana flower. Lisa Marshall, Marijuana Concentrates Sharply Spike THC
Levels But Don’t Necessarily Get Users Higher, CU BOULDER TODAY (June 10,
2020), https://perma.cc/H8AK-5F4Q.
104. See Leins, supra note 100 (comparing the legally permissible quantity
of marijuana with the legally permissible quantity of concentrated marijuana
in states where possession for recreational use is allowed). California permits
one ounce of marijuana and eight grams of concentrated marijuana. Id. Maine
allows 2.5 ounces of marijuana and five grams of concentrated marijuana. Id.
In Nevada, possession of up to one ounce of marijuana and one-eighth of an
ounce of concentrated marijuana is legal. Id. Illinois permits possession of
thirty grams of the marijuana flower and five grams of marijuana concentrate.
Id.
105. See id. (discussing the age restriction on recreational marijuana use).
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Legalization’s impact on drivers’ Fourth Amendment rights has
proved particularly problematic. An overview of the Fourth
Amendment case law surrounding warrantless roadside
searches provides context for analyzing this issue.106
A. The Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment provides the following protections:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.107

The first part of the amendment mandates that all searches and
seizures be reasonable.108 The second portion sets the
parameters for the warrant requirement.109 The amendment
does not state that a warrantless search cannot also be a
reasonable search.110 However, in interpreting the Fourth
Amendment, the Supreme Court has established an expectation
of privacy that protects against warrantless searches absent a
recognized exception.111 When it comes to warrantless, roadside
vehicle searches, the relevant exception is most often the
automobile exception.112

106. See infra Parts 0–0.
107. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See Catherine A. Shepard, Search and Seizure: From Carroll to Ross,
the Odyssey of the Automobile Exception, 32 CATH. U. L. REV. 221, 221 (1983)
(“There is nothing in
either clause [of the Fourth Amendment] to suggest that a warrantless search
and a reasonable search are mutually exclusive.”).
111. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (articulating the twofold requirement for the expectation of
privacy—that the person have a subjective expectation of privacy and that the
expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable).
112. See Shepard, supra note 110, at 222 (“Most warrantless searches of
automobiles are conducted under the search incident to arrest exception or the
automobile exception.”).

HIGH TIME FOR CHANGE

137

B. The Automobile Exception
The Supreme Court first articulated the automobile
exception in Carroll v. United States.113 In Carroll, federal
prohibition agents, tasked with enforcing the Eighteenth
Amendment’s ban on alcoholic beverages,114 stopped a vehicle
driven by George Carroll and John Kiro.115 The agents
proceeded to conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle based
on the belief that Carroll and Kiro were transporting bootleg
alcohol.116 The agents discovered liquor hidden in the vehicle’s
seat cushions.117 Carroll and Kiro were convicted of
“transporting in an automobile intoxicating spirituous
liquor.”118 They challenged the constitutionality of the search,
and the admissibility of evidence obtained through it.119
In deciding Carroll, the Court distinguished the
warrantless search of a motor vehicle from the warrantless
search of a physical building.120 The crucial difference, the Court
113. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
114. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
115. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 160–61 (1925) (discussing
the circumstances surrounding the traffic stop). The agents were conducting
regular patrol along the Michigan highway that runs between Detroit and
Grand Rapids. Id. at 160. At the time, Detroit, located on an international
boundary, was an active location for the illegal importation and distribution of
alcohol. Id. The agents spotted Carroll and Kiro driving westward, presumably
from Detroit, on this stretch of highway and conducted a traffic stop. Id.
116. See id. at 171 (discussing one of the agent’s prior interactions with
Carroll and Kiro, in which the agent, acting undercover, attempted to
purchase whiskey from the two men).
117. See id. at 172 (describing how the agent felt that back of the vehicle’s
seat, felt that it was hard, and proceeded to tear the cushion to find bottles of
liquor concealed in the seatback).
118. Id. at 134.
119. See id.

The ground on which they assail the conviction is that
the trial court admitted in evidence two of the 68 bottles,
one of whisky and one of gin, found by searching the
automobile. It is contended that the search and seizure
were in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and
therefore that use of the liquor as evidence was not
proper.
120. See id. at 151 (articulating the “necessary difference between a search
of a store, dwelling house, or other structure in respect of which a proper
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said, was a vehicle’s inherent mobility, which facilitated the
removal of evidence from the scene.121 Ultimately, the Court
held that a police officer may conduct a warrantless motor
vehicle search if the officer has probable cause to believe the
vehicle contains evidence of illegality.122
Since Carroll, the Supreme Court has further defined the
scope of the automobile exception. Of relevance to warrantless,
roadside searches are the Court’s decisions in United States v.
Di Re,123 United States v. Ross,124 and California v. Acevedo.125
In Di Re, the Court addressed whether to “extend the
assumed right of a car search” to a search of the people
occupying the car.126 The Court held that a person’s mere
presence in a “suspected car” does not mean that the person
“loses the immunities from search of his person to which he
would otherwise be entitled.”127 Accordingly, a warrantless
vehicle search, justified by the reasonable belief that the vehicle
contains contraband, does not give officers the right to
incidentally search the vehicle’s occupants.128 In so deciding, the
Court declined to expand the scope of the automobile exception.
In Ross, the Court was again presented with the
opportunity to expand the scope of the automobile exception.129
The issue in Ross was whether the search of a vehicle’s
compartments and containers was justified by probable cause

official warrant readily may be obtained and a search of a ship, motor boat,
wagon, or automobile for contraband goods”).
121. See id. (describing how “goods subject to forfeiture” in a “movable
vessel” could readily “be put out of reach of search warrant”).
122. See id. at 158–59 (“The right to search and the validity of the
seizure . . . are dependent on the reasonable cause the seizing officer has for
belief that the contents of the automobile offend against the law.”).
123. 332 U.S. 581 (1948).
124. 456 U.S. 798 (1979).
125. 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
126. Di Re, 332 U.S. at 586.
127. Id. at 581.
128. See id. at 587 (“We see no ground for expanding the ruling in the
Carroll case to justify this arrest and search as incident to the search of a
car.”).
129. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 799–800 (1979) (stating that
the Carroll decision did not explicitly address the scope of the vehicle search
that is permissible under the automobile exception).
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that a vehicle contained contraband.130 The Court held that if
“probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle,
it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents
that may conceal the object of the search.”131 The Court
explained that a warrantless search’s scope can be neither
narrower nor broader than the scope of a search authorized by
a warrant.132 Further, the Court articulated that the search’s
object, and the places where that object may reasonably be
found, define the search.133 Therefore, while the automobile
exception waives the warrant requirement, the warrantless
search can only be as extensive as the search a warrant could
allow.134
In Acevedo, the Court was confronted with a question that
it had declined to address in Ross.135 Ross did not answer
130.

See id. at 800

In this case, we consider the extent to which police
officers—who have legitimately stopped an automobile
and who have probable cause to believe that contraband
is concealed somewhere within it—may conduct a
probing search of compartments and containers within
the vehicle whose contents are not in plain view.
131. Id. at 825.
132. See id. at 823 (“An individual undoubtedly has a significant interest
that the upholstery of his automobile will not be ripped or a hidden
compartment within it opened. These interests must yield to the authority of
a search, however, which—in light of Carroll — does not itself require the prior
approval of a magistrate.”).
133. See id. at 824

Just as probable cause to believe that a stolen
lawnmower may be found in a garage will not support a
warrant to search an upstairs bedroom, probable cause
to believe that undocumented aliens are being
transported in a van will not justify a warrantless
search of a suitcase. Probable cause to believe that a
container placed in the trunk of a taxi contains
contraband or evidence does not justify a search of the
entire cab.
134. See id. at 823 (“Only the prior approval of the magistrate is waived;
the search otherwise is as the magistrate could authorize.”).
135. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 573 (1991) (discussing the
Ross court’s recognition that it is “arguable that the same exigent
circumstances that permit a warrantless search of an automobile would justify
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whether a warrant was needed to open a container within a
vehicle if probable cause to search the entire vehicle did not
exist.136 The Court determined that “a container found after a
general search of the automobile and a container found in a car
after a limited search for the container are equally easy for the
police to store and for the suspect to hide or destroy.”137 Further,
the Court concluded that separate rules governing these two
situations may encourage broader warrantless searches that
pose greater threats to privacy interests.138 Accordingly, the
Court held that the “Fourth Amendment does not compel
separate treatment for an automobile search that extends only
to a container within the vehicle.”139 Thus, if police have
probable cause to believe only a container within a vehicle
contains contraband, they can search that container without a
warrant.140 Police do not have to hold the container until they
can obtain a warrant simply because they lack the probable
cause to search the entirety of the vehicle.141

the warrantless search of a movable container” and the court’s decision not to
answer that question out of deference to existing precedent).
136. See id. (“We now must decide the question deferred in Ross: whether
the Fourth Amendment requires the police to obtain a warrant to open the
sack in a movable vehicle simply because they lack probable cause to search
the entire car.”).
137. Id. at 574.
138. See id. at 574–75

At the moment when officers stop an automobile, it may
be less than clear whether they suspect with a high
degree of certainty that the vehicle contains drugs in a
bag or simply contains drugs. If the police know that
they may open a bag only if they are actually searching
the entire car, they may search more extensively than
they otherwise would in order to establish the general
probable cause required by Ross. . . . We cannot see the
benefit of a rule that requires law enforcement officers
to conduct a more intrusive search in order to justify a
less intrusive one.
139. Id. at 576.
140. See id. at 580 (articulating that Carroll provides “one rule to govern
all automobile searches”).
141. See id.
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C. Traffic Stops
To properly contextualize the warrantless searches
permitted by the automobile exception, it is important to
understand the ease with which these roadside situations arise.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Whren v. United States142
addressed the standard for conducting traffic stops. 143 In Whren,
the Court explained that temporary police detention of an
individual during a roadside vehicle stop, however brief,
constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.144
Accordingly, a roadside stop is unconstitutional if its duration
or purpose renders it unreasonable.145
The Petitioners in Whren argued that because automobile
use is so highly regulated, perfect compliance with traffic rules

In the case before us, the police had probable cause to
believe that the paper bag in the automobile’s trunk
contained marijuana. That probable cause now allows a
warrantless search of the paper bag. The facts in the
record reveal that the police did not have probable cause
to believe that contraband was hidden in any other part
of the automobile and a search of the entire vehicle
would have been without probable cause and
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
142.
143.

517 U.S. 806 (1996).
See id. at 808

In this case we decide whether the temporary detention
of a motorist who the police have probable cause to
believe has committed a civil traffic violation is
inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition
against unreasonable seizures unless a reasonable
officer would have been motivated to stop the car by a
desire to enforce the traffic laws.
144. See id. at 809–10 (“Temporary detention of individuals during the
stop of an automobile by the police, even if only for a brief period and for a
limited purpose, constitutes a ‘seizure’ of ‘persons’ within the meaning of [the
Fourth Amendment].”).
145. See id. at 810 (“An automobile stop is thus subject to the
constitutional imperative that it not be ‘unreasonable’ under the
circumstances.”).
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is effectively impossible.146 According to Petitioners, the high
likelihood of noncompliance meant that a “police officer will
almost invariably be able to catch any given motorist in a
technical violation.”147 The result, in Petitioners’ view, was the
opportunity for police to use traffic stops to investigate other
illegality, despite a lack of probable cause or other articulable
suspicion.148 The Court did not reject the Petitioners’
contention.149 However, the Court declined to permit the
subjective motivations of a police officer to factor into the Fourth
Amendment analysis.150 Instead, the Court held that if there is
probable cause that a traffic violation occurred, then the officer’s
decision to stop the vehicle is reasonable.151 This holding
foreclosed the argument that an officer’s ulterior motive can
invalidate conduct based on probable cause,152 even if the motive
is a desire to confirm suspicions of other criminal activity.153
Thus, a police officer that suspects a driver of criminal activity,
but lacks probable cause to act on that suspicion, can almost
certainly find a traffic violation to justify initiating a stop.154
Once the driver has been stopped, the automobile exception
permits an officer to conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle
if he believes there is probable cause that it contains evidence of
illegality.155
146. See id. (discussing Petitioners’ contention that “total compliance with
traffic and safety rules is nearly impossible” given that the “use of automobiles
is so heavily and minutely regulated”).
147. Id.
148. See id. (discussing the Petitioners’ claim that police officers were
using traffic stops as a pretext for investigating other crimes even when the
requisite probable cause was lacking).
149. Id.
150. See id. at 813 (“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary,
probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”).
151.
See id. at 810 (“As a general matter, the decision to stop an
automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that
a traffic violation has occurred.”).
152. See id. at 813 (“We think these cases foreclose any argument that the
constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual
motivations of the individual officers involved.”).
153. See id. at 810 (acknowledging “the temptation to use traffic stops as
a means of investigation other law violations, as to which no probable cause or
even articulable suspicion exists”).
154. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
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In the absence of a concrete probable cause standard, the
decision to conduct the warrantless search rests fully in the
officer’s discretion. Accordingly, the lack of a reliable standard
for probable cause makes suspected marijuana impairment an
attractive basis for initiating a warrantless search. To keep
whatever is discovered during the search out of court, the
officer’s word is pitted against the driver’s word with no
established standard by which to judge the reasonableness of
the search.
III. ROADSIDE DETERMINATION OF MARIJUANA IMPAIRMENT
Scientific limitations and a lack of technological
advancement make determining marijuana impairment during
a traffic stop particularly challenging. Comparing how police
evaluate marijuana impairment with the established testing
scheme in place for alcohol impairment is illustrative.
A. Roadside Determination of Alcohol Impairment
The proliferation of the automobile in the early twentieth
century coincided with the prohibition movement.156
Predictably, “drunk driving” laws first appeared during this
era.157 Crucial to the effective enforcement of these new laws
was the question of how impairment could be proven in court.158
Initially, drunk driving convictions were based solely on
contemporaneous observations of the driver at the time of

156. See William J. McNichol, Jr., Toward a Rational Policy for Dealing
with Marijuana Impairment—Moving Beyond “He Looked Buzzed to Me, Your
Honor”, 45 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1, 4 (2020) (“The beginning of widespread use of
automobiles in the United States roughly coincided with the alcohol
prohibition era, which began with the long campaigns that led to the adoption
of the Eighteenth Amendment in 1919 and ended with its repeal by the
Twenty-First Amendment in 1933.”).
157. See id. (“New Jersey enacted what is believed to be the United States’
first drunk driving law in 1906, which consisted of a single sentence: ‘No
intoxicated person shall drive a motor vehicle.’ New York followed suit in
1910 . . . .”).
158. See id. (“With the enactment of these laws America embarked on its
long journey to set evidentiary rules by which the fact of impairment can be
proven in court.”).
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arrest.159 Courts, “believing the attributes of alcohol intoxication
are so well-known and generally understood,” permitted anyone
to testify regarding a driver’s level of impairment.160 No specific
observation methods were required and opinion testimony was
sufficient to sustain a conviction.161
The unreliability and inconsistency of relying on the
observations and opinions of laypersons quickly became evident
as did the need for an objective standard.162 By the 1950s,
epidemiologist Dr. William Haddon was attempting to discover
a scientific connection between alcohol and dangerous
driving.163 Dr. Haddon’s work revealed that fatal automobile
accidents were strongly correlated with a BAC of 0.08 – 0.10
percent.164 Subsequent scientific research confirmed Dr.
Haddon’s finding.165 Ultimately, a BAC of 0.08 percent became
recognized as a scientifically-sound proxy for alcohol
impairment.166 As a result, drunk driving statutes were
159. See id. at 5 (“At the time of the early drunk driving laws, there was
only one way to prove impairment: contemporaneous observation of the
accused. Indeed, a conviction ‘could be based solely on the defendant’s conduct
and demeanor at the time of arrest.’”).
160. See id. (“The widespread and frequent occurrence of alcohol
intoxication led courts to accept testimony of this sort from anyone.”).
161. See id.

Courts have received factual testimony concerning
things like an odor of alcohol, stumbling, or general lack
of physical coordination. But witnesses in alcohol
impairment cases have not been limited to factual
testimony. . . . [C]ourts early on ruled that any person is
competent to testify as to their opinion that a driver was
alcohol impaired . . . .
162. See id. at 6–7 (discussing how the limitations of human memory, the
existences of implicit biases, and the disparities in police enforcement made
relying on lay witnesses’ accounts of alcohol impairment problematic).
163. See id. at 7 (discussing Dr. Haddon’s “effort to find a science-based
standard for alcohol impairment”).
164. See id. (describing how Dr. Haddon initially used reports of
single-vehicle fatal accidents to identify the relevant BAC range and how
subsequent studies and laboratory simulations confirmed his findings).
165. See id. (discussing the subsequent studies and laboratory simulations
that confirmed Dr. Haddon’s findings).
166. See id. (“As a result of the rigorous epidemiologic studies by Dr.
Haddon and his colleagues, a BAC of 0.08% has come to be recognized as a
valid, science-based proxy for alcohol impairment.”).
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supplemented by per se prohibitions against driving with a BAC
of 0.08 percent or above.167 The use of the BAC standard
constituted a significant improvement over the prior reliance on
lay opinion evidence.168 However, the standard did not
“eliminate bias and inconsistency in the enforcement of drunk
driving laws.”169
The advent of the Breathalyzer in 1954 brought the BAC
standard to the roadside.170 The technology offered a compact,
reliable, and easy to operate means for law enforcement to
determine impairment during a traffic stop.171 Its use quickly
became common practice.172 Since the 1950s, breath test devices
have continued to progress and now operate both more quickly
and more accurately.173 Today, the preliminary breath test
(“PBT”), conducted using a portable breathalyzer machine, is
the most reliable means by which a police officer can establish
probable cause.174 If the results of a PBT estimate that a driver’s
167. See id. (“Statutes containing the general prohibition against driving
while impaired were not repealed, but merely supplemented by the per se
prohibition against driving with a BAC of 0.08%.”).
168. See id. (discussing how the BAC standard “makes it possible to
perform a biochemical test that, if properly executed, gives an objective,
verifiable result that can be compared to a bright line standard—a remarkable
advance over reliance upon lay opinion testimony that ‘he looked drunk to
me’”).
169. Id.
170. See A.W. Jones, Measuring Alcohol in Blood and Breath for Forensic
Purposes—A Historical Review, 8 FOR. SCI. REV. 13, 34 (1996) (discussing
Indiana State Police Lt. R. F. Borkenstien’s development of the Breathalyzer).
171. See id. (describing the Breathalyzer as the “singly most important
contribution to methods of breath-alcohol analysis for law enforcement
purposes”).
172. See Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. 438, 446 (2016) (discussing
the “more practical machine, called the ‘Breathalyzer,’” which “came into
common use beginning in the 1950’s”).
173. See id. (“Over time, improved breath test machines were developed.
Today, such devices can detect the presence of alcohol more quickly and
accurately than before, typically using infrared technology rather than a
chemical reaction.”).
174. See Nick Surma, Comment, Searches and Automobiles—Grounds or
Cause: Assessing the Constitutionality of Warrantless Pre-Arrest Breath
Tests and the Grounds on Which Such Tests May Be Required, 93 N.D. L. REV.
161, 165 (2018) (discussing the agreement among courts that probable cause
is not required before a police officer can request that a driver submit to
roadside screening in the form of a PBT—reasonable suspicion that the driver
is intoxicated is sufficient).
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BAC is above the legal limit, the officer is practically certain to
have sufficient grounds to make an arrest.175
Once an arrest is made, a police officer often does not have
to rely on the automobile exception to search the driver’s
vehicle.176 When the flow of traffic is disrupted or the public
safety is threatened, the police are authorized to take a vehicle
into their custody.177 Generally, an impounded vehicle is then
subjected to a warrantless inventory search.178 The Supreme
Court has upheld the constitutionality of inventory searches of
lawfully impounded vehicles, finding that the search is
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment so long as police
follow standardized procedures.179 Any evidence obtained
during a lawfully-conducted inventory search can be used
against a defendant at trial.180 However, it is crucial to
175. See id. at 174 (describing how DUI cases are unlikely to be dismissed
when a PBT was administered roadside, and the results indicated impairment
above the legal limit).
176. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368–69 (1976)
(discussing the public safety and community caretaking interests that support
the authority of police to impound automobiles).
177. See id. at 369 (“The authority of police to seize and remove from the
streets vehicles impeding traffic or threatening public safety and convenience
is beyond challenge.”).
178. See id.

When vehicles are impounded, local police departments
generally follow a routine practice of securing and
inventorying the automobiles’ contents. These
procedures developed in response to three distinct
needs: the protection of the owner’s property while it
remains in police custody, the protection of the police
against claims or disputes over lost or stolen property
and the protection of the police from potential danger.
The practice has been viewed as essential to respond to
incidents of theft or vandalism. In addition, police
frequently attempt to determine whether a vehicle has
been stolen and thereafter abandoned. (citations
omitted).
179. See id. at 372 (“The decisions of this Court point unmistakably to the
conclusion reached by both federal and state courts that inventories pursuant
to standard police procedures are reasonable.”).
180. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 369 (1987) (holding that the
Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the admissibility of evidence discovered
during an authorized inventory search).
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remember that in the DUI context, the police must first have
had probable cause to arrest the driver before conducting a
warrantless inventory search.181 The BAC standard provides an
established and reliable metric by which to judge the sufficiency
of an officer’s probable cause determination.182 In contexts
where no BAC-like standard exists, police need other evidence
to establish probable cause before making an arrest. In those
situations, a pre-arrest warrantless search under the
automobile exception is an attractive option.
B. The Lack of a BAC Standard Equivalent in the Marijuana
Impairment Context
Currently, there is no reliable bright-line test for marijuana
impairment that is equivalent to the BAC standard for alcohol
impairment.183 While tetrahydrocannabinol (“THC”) is
generally considered to be the “psychoactive compound
responsible for marijuana impairment,” scientific evidence
suggests that THC blood levels are not a scientifically reliable
indicator of impairment.184 Studies by both the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) and the
American Automobile Association (“AAA”) have failed to find a
statistically significant correlation between THC concentration
and driving skills.185 Numerous other studies have reached
similar, or in some instances, more unfavorable conclusions.186
Some research suggests a negative correlation between THC

181. See supra notes 174–175 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
183. See McNichol, supra note 156, at 36 (discussing how the “success of
Dr. Haddon’s work establishing 0.08% BAC as a proxy for alcohol impairment
naturally led to interest in finding a biochemical proxy for marijuana
intoxication that would serve as the basis for a per se marijuana impairment
statute”).
184. See id. (challenging the assumption that blood THC concentration is
a biochemical proxy for marijuana intoxication).
185. See id. at 37 (citing the findings of the two studies). The NHTSA study
found that when other risk factors, such as age, gender, ethnicity, and alcohol
use, were accounted for, blood THC was not correlated with an increased crash
risk. Id. The AAA study concluded that impairment cannot be inferred from
THC blood concentration. Id.
186. See id. at 37–38 (discussing seven studies that rejected the notion of
a connection between THC blood levels and driving performance).
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concentration and impairment.187 In these studies, researchers
observed little to no impairment when THC levels were
highest.188 Instead, the evidence showed that impairment
manifested only “well after blood THC had declined well below
its peak level.”189 These findings indicated that THC levels do
not “provide an accurate and reliable indicator” for determining
whether driving performance is negatively impacted by
marijuana use.190 Further, a study surveying the field of existing
research concluded that “a per se impairment rule based on a
blood THC concentration” is a “mirage.”191
The scientific community has yet to settle on a definitive
explanation for why blood THC concentration does not correlate
with impairment.192 Some scientists believe that THC is not
marijuana’s impairment-inducing compound.193 Other research
indicates that regular or long-term marijuana users may
develop a tolerance to THC.194 These habitual users may not
show signs of impairment at THC blood levels that would impair
less-frequent users.195 Additionally, there is some evidence to
suggest a gender disparity in the effects of marijuana.196
Further, various studies have reported the possibility of a lag
between when THC is traceable in blood and when it enters the
187. See id. at 38 (citing the following studies: K. Papafotiou et al., The
Relationship Between Performance on the Standardized Field Sobriety Tests,
Driving Performance and the Level of Δ9-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) in
Blood, 155 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 172 (2005) and Giovanni Battstella et al., Weed
or Wheel! fMRI, Behavioural, and Toxicological Investigations of How
Cannabis Smoking Affects Skills Necessary for Driving, 8 PLOS ONE 1, 13
(2013)).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. See id. (citing Gary M. Reisfield et al., The Mirage of Impairing Drug
Concentration Thresholds: A Rationale for Zero Tolerance Per Se Driving
Under the Influence of Drug Laws, 36 J. ANALYTICAL TOXICOLOGY 354, 353–56
(2012)).
192. See id. (“Why is it that the blood levels of THC are not correlated with
impairment? The answer is not entirely known, and may be the result of a
combination of factors.”).
193. See id. (suggesting that marijuana impairment may be caused by
THC’s metabolites, such as THCC or THC-COOH, rather than by THC itself).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
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brain.197 One of these factors, or a combination of several of
them, may explain why THC is not a valid biochemical proxy for
marijuana impairment.198 These factors may also explain why
finding a THC substitute that can act as a reliable impairment
proxy remains elusive.199
C. The Limitations of the Currently-Utilized Roadside
Assessments
The absence of a BAC-equivalent proxy highlights the
challenges of determining marijuana impairment as compared
to the relative ease of determining alcohol impairment during
motor vehicle stops. A BAC-like standard is a prerequisite for
developing and using any breathalyzer-like technology in the
marijuana-impairment context. Without an objective standard,
there can be no objective method of roadside testing for
marijuana impairment. Thus, during a traffic stop, assessments
of marijuana-impairment are currently limited to police officer
observations and the results of Field Sobriety Tests (“FSTs”).200
This reality is startingly problematic as neither a police
officer’s observations nor FST results are dispositive indicators
of whether a driver is impaired by marijuana. A police officer’s
observations and analysis of a driver’s appearance, behavior,
and statements are inherently subjective.201 Consider a police
197. See id. at 38–39 (concluding that this lag time would put THC blood
levels out of synch with other indicators of impairment).
198. Id. at 39.
199. Id.
200. See id. at 13 (describing the components of the twelve-step protocol
for identifying drug-impaired drivers used by Drug Recognition Expert
(“DRE”) police officers). A police officer becomes certified or accredited as a
DRE after completing an approved educational course in the relevant
jurisdiction. Id. at 12. These courses purport to train officers to administer a
standardized twelve-step protocol and to observe and interpret the results of
each step to determine drug-impairment. Id. at 13. The protocol is conducted
following a driver’s arrest. Id. Thus, it does not establish a roadside method by
which arresting officers are expected to determine impairment. Id. However,
the arresting officer’s observations and the results of common FSTs are key
components of the protocol. Id. The inclusion of these factors in the DRE
protocol is evidence of their centrality to roadside impairment assessments.
Id.
201. See U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN.,
MARIJUANA-IMPAIRED DRIVING—A REPORT TO CONGRESS 8 (2017),
https://perma.cc/4SXC-7VW9 (describing the role of a police officer’s
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officer that conducts a traffic stop and observes that the driver’s
hands are shaking, and that the driver is hesitant to answer
questions. These observations may be interpreted as signs of
impairment or may just as reasonably be interpreted as
nervousness resulting from an interaction with law
enforcement. Further, while marijuana use can impair
important driving-related skills,202 current research indicates
an observation-based assessment is not a sufficiently reliable
means of determining impairment.203
Scientific research regarding the use of traditional FSTs for
determining marijuana impairment demonstrates that these
assessments are similarly unreliable.204 FSTs were created to
detect alcohol impairment.205 The two FSTs that are most
frequently administered during traffic stops are the Walk and
Turn (“WAT”)206 and the One Leg Stand (“OLS”)207
assessments.208 These Divided Attention Psychophysical Tests
observation-based suspicions in the impaired-driving detection process that
takes place during a traffic stop).
202. See id. at 18 (discussing marijuana’s problematic effects on
“psychomotor abilities like reaction time, tracking ability, and target
detection, cognitive skills like judgment, anticipation, and divided attention,
and executive functions like route planning and risk taking”).
203. See id. (“[A]vailable research does not support the development of
such a psychomotor, behavioral or cognitive test that would be practical and
feasible for law enforcement use at this time.”).
204. See Commonwealth v. Gerhardt, 81 N.E.3d 751, 757 (Mass. 2017)
(citing conflicting studies regarding the reliability of FSTs in the
marijuana-impairment context).
205. Id. at 756.
206. During the administration of a WAT test, the police officer directs the
driver to “take nine steps, walking heel-to-toe, along a real or imaginary
straight line.” Id. The driver is then directed to turn around on one foot and
return along the line in the same manner. Id. In observing the driver during a
WAT assessment, the police officer looks for eight indicators of impairment:
“losing balance while listening to the instructions, beginning before the
instructions are finished, stopping to regain balance while walking, failing to
walk heel-to-toe, stepping off the line, using arms to balance, making an
improper turn, or taking an incorrect number of steps.” Id.
207. During the administration of an OLS test, the police officer instructs
the driver to “stand on one foot raised approximately six inches off the ground
while counting aloud for thirty seconds.” Id. at 757. In observing the driver
during an OLS assessment, the police officer looks for four indicators of
impairment: “swaying while balancing, using arms to balance, hopping to
maintain balance, and putting the foot down.” Id.
208. Id. at 756.
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are designed to test a driver’s balance, coordination, dexterity,
ability to follow directions, and capacity to simultaneously focus
attention on multiple subjects.209 Scientific studies have
concluded that there is an established correlation between
performance on the WAT and OLS tests and a driver’s BAC.210
Research shows that 79 percent of drivers who exhibited two or
more of the eight WAT impairment indicators had BACs of 0.08
percent or higher.211 The correlation was even stronger for the
four OLS impairment indicators.212 As many as 83 percent of
drivers exhibiting two or more of the indicators were found to
have a BAC of 0.08 percent or above.213
Scientists have conducted analogous studies aimed at
determining whether a similar correlation exists between
performance on FSTs and marijuana impairment.214 These
studies have not produced a conclusive answer.215 One study
found that FSTs are “mildly sensitive” to effects of marijuana
use with the OLS test being the most sensitive.216 However, the
results of that same study also included a significant number of
false positives from the OLS test.217 Other research suggests
that the WAT test is a more reliable indicator of marijuana
impairment than the OLS.218 Still other studies found no
209. Id. Alcohol depresses the central nervous system, impairing functions
throughout the body, including functions that are crucial to a driver’s ability
to safely operate a vehicle. Id. at 757. Those crucial functions are the ones that
Divided Attention Psychophysical Tests are designed to assess. Id.
210. See id. at 756–57 (citing studies that have found a correlation between
the presence of two or more WAT or OLS impairment indicators and a BAC
above the 0.08 legal limit).
211. Id.
212. Id. at 757.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. See id. (describing the ongoing disagreement among scientists
regarding whether FSTs are indicative of marijuana impairment).
216. See id. (citing Bosker et al., A Placebo-Controlled Study to Assess
Standardized Field Sobriety Tests Performance During Alcohol and Cannabis
Intoxication in Heavy Cannabis Users and Accuracy of Point of Collection
Devices for Detecting THC in Oral Fluid, 223 PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 439, 443–
44 (2012) [hereinafter Bosker Study]).
217. See id. (citing additional results from the Bosker Study).
218. See id. at 758 (citing Declues et al., A 2-Year Study of
Delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol Concentrations in Drivers: Examining Driving
and Field Sobriety Test Performance, 61 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1664, 1669 (2016)).
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correlation at all between marijuana use and performance on
FSTs.219
In part, these varied results can be explained by the fact
that marijuana, unlike alcohol, does not act as a general central
nervous system depressant.220 Thus, while marijuana use can
impair driving ability, it does not do so in the same way that
alcohol does.221 The depressant effects of alcohol consumption
impair functions throughout the body.222 Marijuana use
operates differently. Some scientists believe marijuana
impairment is linked to the effects of THC, which has been
found to impact certain brain functions relevant to driving
performance.223 Accordingly, assessments, like FSTs, that are
designed to detect alcohol impairment, are not appropriately
transferable to the marijuana-impairment context.
In marijuana impairment cases, courts are aware of the
limitations of the arresting police officer’s subjective
observations224 and of the unreliability of the results of FSTs.225
While evidence of this nature may be adequate proof of
impairment in the alcohol context, it likely will not suffice in
marijuana cases. Therefore, a police officer, suspicious that a
driver is operating under the influence of marijuana, will be
looking for additional proof of impairment during the traffic
219. See id. (citing Neavyn et al., Medical Marijuana and Driving: A
Review, 10 J. MED. TOXICOLOGY 269 (2014) and Jones et. al, Driving Under the
Influence of Cannabis: The Problem and Potential Countermeasures, 87 CRIME
& JUST. BULLETIN 1 (2005)).
220. Id. at 757.
221. See id. (contrasting the effects of marijuana use with the way in which
alcohol impairs bodily functions by depressing the central nervous system).
222. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
223. See Commonwealth v. Gerhardt, 81 N.E.3d 751, 757 (Mass. 2017)
(explaining that THC has been found to decrease a driver’s divided attention
capacity, impair balance, and slow information processing); see also supra Part
0 (discussing various studies that suggest THC is not correlated with
marijuana impairment).
224. See, e.g., State v. Bealor, 902 A.2d 226, 227–28 (N.J. 2006) (holding
that competent lay observations of the fact of marijuana intoxication do not
constitute proofs sufficient to allow the fact-finder to conclude that a driver
was impaired unless coupled with additional independent proof of the driver’s
consumption of marijuana at the time of arrest).
225. See, e.g., Gerhardt, 81 N.E.3d at 758 (“It is clear . . . that the scientific
community has yet to reach a consensus on the reliability of FSTs to assess
whether a driver is under the influence of marijuana.”).
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stop. That proof may be concealed within the driver’s vehicle.
However, a police officer’s mere suspicions do not constitute
probable cause sufficient to support a search of the vehicle under
the automobile exception.226 Thus, the officer, lacking a
BAC-equivalent standard, a breathalyzer-like device, and
reliable FSTs, must establish probable cause that the vehicle
contains evidence of illegality another way. Without the ability
to reliably establish impairment during a traffic stop, police
officers have an incentive to search the vehicle first and find
probable cause later.
IV. CASE STUDIES
Part IV consists of three state-based case studies. The
selected states, Washington, Massachusetts, and Virginia, have
all legalized marijuana in some capacity.227 Despite that
commonality, each of these states presents a distinct legal
approach to determining marijuana impairment amongst
drivers.228 Washington has imposed a per se THC impairment
level analogous to the BAC standard for alcohol impairment.229
Massachusetts has resisted acting legislatively to establish
impairment standards, instead leaving the courts to set the
parameters
for
making
marijuana
intoxication
determination.230 Virginia, the most recent of the three states to
legalize marijuana,231 has acted legislatively to ban searches
based solely on the odor of marijuana.232 But beyond that action,
Virginia has taken few steps towards defining the boundaries of
marijuana impairment determinations.233 The case studies will
further elaborate on each of these approaches, laying a

226. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
227. See infra Parts 0–0 (discussing the legal status of marijuana in
Washington, Massachusetts, and Virginia).
228. Id.
229. See infra Part 0.
230. See infra Part 0.
231. See JM Pendi, Virginia: Marijuana Decriminalization Takes Effect
July 1, NORML (May 21, 2020), https://perma.cc/7NHS-66VQ (discussing
Virginia’s decriminalization of marijuana, which took effect in July of 2020).
232. VA. CODE. ANN. § 4.1-1302(a) (2021).
233. See infra Part 0.
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foundation for the prescriptive recommendations that follow in
Part V.234
A. Case Study: Washington
On November 6, 2012, voters in Washington replaced
marijuana prohibition with a framework that legalized
marijuana for adults over the age of twenty-one.235 Initiative
Measure No. 502 (“I-502”) removed all civil and criminal
penalties for possession and use of a limited amount of
marijuana.236 Per I-502, adults aged 21 and older can possess,
use, and purchase up to one ounce of marijuana without
violating state law.237
Marijuana-impaired driving remained illegal after the
enactment of I-502.238 A Washington driver “under the influence
or affected by” marijuana is guilty of driving under the
influence.239 Further, I-502 established a per se limit that is
analogous to the 0.08 BAC standard for alcohol impairment.240
In Washington, a driver can also be found guilty of a marijuana
DUI if “the person has, within two hours after driving, a THC
concentration of 5.00 [nanograms per milliliter of blood ] or
higher.”241 This determination is made by a blood test conducted
in accordance with Wash. Rev. Code § 46.61.506 and the

234. See infra Part 0.
235. See MARIJUANA POLICY PROJECT, I-502: AN OVERVIEW OF
WASHINGTON’S NEW APPROACH TO MARIJUANA 1, https://perma.cc/RFN3-KMFK
(discussing voters’ approval of the new marijuana policy by a margin of 56
percent to 44 percent). The new law became effective on December 6, 2012. Id.
Washington’s State Liquor and Cannabis Board spent 2013 drafting rules and
regulations for I-502’s implementation. Id. The marijuana retailers in the
state opened on July 8, 2014. Id.
236. See WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.360 (2015) (codifying the limits for legal
possession and use of marijuana established by I-502).
237. Id.
238. See WASH. REV. CODE § 46.61.502(1) (2017) (codifying I-502’s
prohibition on marijuana-impaired driving).
239. Id. § 46.61.502(1)(c) (2017).
240. See id. § 46.61.502(1)(b) (2017) (codifying the per se marijuana
impairment standard established by I-502).
241. Id. A driver with a THC concentration equal to or greater than the
5.00 standard can be arrested and charged without any additional proof of
impairment. Id.
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methods approved by the state toxicologist.242 To obtain the
blood test, a police officer must satisfy two requirements. First,
the officer must have “reasonable grounds to believe” the driver
is impaired by marijuana in violation of Washington DUI law.243
Second, the officer must obtain a search warrant.244
In practice, these two requirements create only a low bar.
In State v. Tibbets,245 the Washington Supreme Court affirmed
that “the odor of marijuana in a vehicle may provide probable
cause to arrest the sole occupant.”246 Thus, it follows that the
smell of marijuana alone would suffice as “reasonable grounds
to believe” a driver has violated Washington DUI law.
Accordingly, the odor of marijuana brought about by a driver’s
legal possession or prior legal use of marijuana would satisfy the
first requirement. Regarding the second requirement,
Washington State Superior Court Criminal Rule 2.3 mandates
a showing of probable cause for the issuance of warrant.247
However, under Rule 2.3, a police officer’s unsworn statement,
provided to the court by “any reliable means,” is sufficient
evidence of probable cause.248 The ease of obtaining a warrant
coupled with the minimal evidence needed to establish
“reasonable grounds” is concerning. In theory, a driver in
compliance with Washington’s marijuana laws and not
exhibiting any signs of impairment can be subjected to a
court-ordered blood test. Given the lack of scientific evidence
supporting a correlation between THC blood levels and
marijuana impairment, 249 guilt based solely on this THC
standard is problematic.

242. See id. § 46.61.506 (2017) (codifying the blood testing process). The
5.00 concentration standard is equivalent to 5 nanograms of THC per milliliter
of blood. Id. § 46.61.506(2)(b).
243. Id. § 46.20.308(4) (2019).
244. Id.
245. 236 P.3d 885 (Wash. 2010).
246. State v. Tibbets, 236 P.3d 885, 888 (Wash. 2010).
247. Wash. State Super. Ct. Crim. R. 2.3(c) (2021).
248. Id.
249. See supra Part 0.
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B. Case Study: Massachusetts

On November 8, 2016, Massachusetts voters legalized
marijuana by ballot initiative.250 The measure authorized
“possession, use, and purchase of 1 ounce or less of marijuana
for adults 21 and older” beginning on December 15, 2016.251 The
measure was silent on the question of how police would
determine drugged driving.252 At the time of the ballot
initiative’s passage, state law prohibited driving under the
influence of marijuana.253 However, the state did not have a
BAC-equivalent standard for marijuana impairment and the
ballot initiative did not establish one.254
In the five years since Massachusetts legalized marijuana,
state lawmakers have declined to enact legislation that would
impose a per se impairment standard. A 2021 bill, backed by
Governor Charlie Baker, would institute other measures aimed
at giving law enforcement more tools to enforce impaired driving
laws.255 House Bill No. 4255 would expand the deployment of
DRE-trained police officers and require courts to accept their

250. See Joshua Miller, Mass. Voters Say “Yes” to Legalizing Marijuana,
BOS. GLOBE (Nov. 9, 2016, 7:08 AM), https://perma.cc/RG52-J9C6 (discussing
the passage of Question 4 by a 53 percent of the vote despite opposition from
Governor Charlie Baker and Boston Mayor Martin Walsh).
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 90, § 24 (2021)

Whoever, upon any way or in any place to which the
public has a right of access, or upon any way or in any
place to which members of the public have access as
invitees or licensees, operates a motor vehicle . . . while
under the influence of intoxicating liquor, or of
marijuana, narcotic drugs, depressants or stimulant
substances . . . shall be punished by a fine of not less
than five hundred nor more than five thousand dollars
or by imprisonment for not more than two and one-half
years, or both such fine and imprisonment.
254. See Miller, supra note 250 (describing the ballot initiative as “set[ting]
up a cascade of tough decisions for officials across the state,” including how
police would measure drugged driving in the absence of a 0.08 BAC-like
standard).
255. H.B. 4255, 192d Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess., (Mass. 2021).
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testimony as that of expert witnesses.256 Additionally, the bill
would allow police officers to seek electronic search warrants for
evidence of marijuana intoxication, including blood draws.257
Further, H.B. 4255 would suspend the license of any driver
suspected of marijuana impairment that refused to submit to
such chemical testing.258 The bill has met opposition from state
legislators.259 That opposition prompted the Judiciary
Committee to send the proposal to study—a procedural action
that effectively ensures the bill will not pass during the current
legislative session.260
In the absence of legislative directives, the parameters of
Massachusetts law regarding the roadside determination of
marijuana impairment have come from Supreme Judicial Court
(“SJC”) decisions. The SJC began redefining marijuana case law
following the substance’s decriminalization in 2008 and has
continued to do so since legalization took effect in 2016.261 In
2013, SJC decisions established that the presence of less than
one ounce of marijuana in a vehicle did not amount to probable
256. Id.
257. See id. (permitting magistrates to grant search warrants authorizing
a medical professional to conduct a blood draw on a driver suspected of
marijuana impairment).
258. See id. (imposing a six-month driver’s license suspension for refusing
a chemical test for impairment).
259. See State House News Service, Study Order Snufs Out Baker’s
Drugged Driving Bill, WHDH 7NEWS BOS. (Feb. 7, 2022),
https://perma.cc/6J55-EMG7

“I just think we don’t yet have a reliable device like we
do with alcohol to determine if someone is impaired,”
said Sen. Jamie Eldridge, an Acton Democrat and cochair of the Judiciary Committee. “I think it’s really,
really important to emphasize the measure in the
governor’s proposal to allegedly detect marijuana
intoxication while driving is deeply flawed, using
biofluids.”
260. See id. (“The Judiciary Committee last week put the governor’s bill (H
4255) into a study order, essentially sealing its fate as a proposal that won’t
pass this legislative session. The committee did the same thing to Baker’s
similar legislation during the previous two-year session.”).
261. See Commonwealth v. Cruz, 945 N.E.2d 899, 911 (Mass. 2011)
(holding that in the wake of the 2008 ballot initiative, “the odor of burnt
marijuana alone cannot reasonably provide suspicion of criminal activity.”).
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cause.262 Further, the SJC has held that the odor of marijuana
alone does not constitute probable cause sufficient to support a
warrantless motor vehicle search.263 Currently, the
Commonwealth’s highest court permits warrantless searches
based on the officer’s observations of the driver’s appearance
and behavior during a roadside stop.264 However, the SJC has
explicitly acknowledged the lack of “scientific agreement on
whether, and, if so, to what extent [FSTs] are indicative of
marijuana intoxication.”265 For this reason, the SJC prohibits
police officers from offering an opinion “as to whether a driver
was under the influence of marijuana” unless the officer has
been qualified as an expert.266 Accordingly, a police officer’s

262. See Commonwealth v. Pacheco, 985 N.E.3d 839, 842 (Mass. 2013)
(holding that “signs of recent marijuana use, and the presence in the vehicle
of less than an ounce of what the officer believed to be marijuana” did not
amount to probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle);
Commonwealth v. Daniel, 985 N.E.2d 843, 849 (Mass. 2013) (holding that
“absent articulable facts supporting a belief that either occupant of the vehicle
possessed a criminal amount of marijuana,” the warrantless search of the
vehicle was not justified).
263. See Commonwealth v. Overmyer, 11 N.E.3d 1054, 1059–60 (Mass.
2014)

In sum, we are not confident . . . that a human nose can
discern reliably the presence of a criminal amount of
marijuana, as distinct from an amount subject only to a
civil fine. In the absence of reliability, “a neutral
magistrate would not issue a search warrant, and
therefore a warrantless search is not justified based
solely on the smell of marijuana,” whether burnt or
unburnt. (quoting Commonwealth v. Daniel 985 N.E.2d
843, 847 (Mass. 2013)).
264. See Commonwealth v. Davis, 114 N.E.3d 556, 564 (Mass. 2019)
(finding probable cause to support a warrantless search during a roadside stop
based on the police officer’s observations). The police officer’s observations of
the driver’s appearance and behavior included red and glassy eyes, slow
coordination, and the inability to keep his head upright, to focus, and to follow
simple directions. Id. The officer also observed the smell of marijuana was
emanating from the driver and testified that the driver admitted to having
smoke marijuana earlier in the day. Id.
265. Commonwealth v. Gerhardt, 81 N.E.3d 751, 754 (Mass. 2017).
266. Id.
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testimony on the subject of marijuana impairment is limited to
the officer’s observations of the driver.267
By resisting the adoption of bright-line intoxication
standards, the Massachusetts legislature has demonstrated an
awareness of the scientific inaccuracies associated with defining
marijuana impairment.268 The SJC has been similarly cognizant
of these technical limitations and has attempted to protect
driver’s Fourth Amendment rights in the absence of conclusive
scientific findings.269
C. Case Study: Virginia
Marijuana became legal in Virginia on July 1, 2021.270
Adults over the age of twenty-one may possess up to one ounce
of marijuana for personal use and may grow up to four plants
per household.271 Like in Massachusetts, the legislation
authorizing legalization did not alter existing state law that
prohibited driving a motor vehicle under the influence of
marijuana.272 At the time, Virginia already had per se limits for
certain drug-related DUI offenses.273 However, when the
267. See id. (“The introduction in evidence of the officer’s observations of
what will be described as ‘roadside assessments’ shall be without any
statement as to whether the driver’s performance would have been deemed a
‘pass’ or a ‘fail,’ or whether the performance indicated impairment.”).
268. See supra Part 0.
269. See supra notes 261–267 and accompanying text.
270. See Cannabis in Virginia: Frequently Asked Questions,
https://perma.cc/XYU2-XMRX

On April 7, 2021, Virginia became the first state in the
South to begin the process of legalizing adult-use
cannabis. . . . These changes began on July 1, 2021 with
the authorization of a new state authority to regulate
the industry and with the legalization of simple
possession and cultivation for adults 21 years and over.
271. Id.
272. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-266(iii) (2021) (making it unlawful for any
person to drive or operate a motor vehicle while under such person is under
the influence of any “narcotic drug or any other self-administered intoxicant
or drug of whatsoever nature, or any combination of such drugs, to a degree
which impairs his ability to drive or operate any motor vehicle . . . .”).
273. See id. § 18.2-266(v) (making it unlawful for any person to drive or
operate a motor vehicle “while such person has a blood concentration of any of
the following substances at a level that is equal to or greater than” the
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Commonwealth legalized marijuana, it opted not to add a per se
limit for marijuana DUI offenses.274
Prior to the state’s legalization of marijuana, Virginia
legislators had attempted to enact a per se standard.275 In 2006,
House Bill No. 1182 was introduced.276 The measure provided
that “a person who drives with 0.003 milligrams of
tetrahydrocannabinol per liter of his blood is driving under the
influence of drugs.”277 The measure passed the House of
Delegates by a vote of 98-0.278 However, the Senate never
brought the bill up for a vote.279
Thirteen years later, the Commonwealth’s Attorney for
Albemarle County urged the legislature to renew its efforts to
enact a per se standard for marijuana impairment.280 In 2019,
prosecutor Robert Tracci lost a high-profile case involving a
truck driver that drove across railroad tracks and was hit by an
Amtrak train.281 According to Tracci, the truck driver had a THC
level of 6.6 nanograms per milliliter of blood more than five
hours after the crash.282 When Tracci’s office brought charges,
the judge dismissed the DUI claim after declining to admit

established limits). Per the law, a driver is guilty of a drug-related DUI if a
blood test reveals levels equal to or greater than 0.02 milligrams of cocaine per
liter of blood, 0.1 milligrams of methamphetamine per liter of blood, 0.01
milligrams of phencyclidine per liter of blood, or 0.1 milligrams of
3,4-methylenedioxmethamphetmaine per liter of blood. Id.
274. See id. (failing to include a per se limit for marijuana impairment).
275. See Sandy Hausman, Prosecutor Pushes for Standards for Marijuana
DUI, NPR (Apr. 2, 2019, 12:45 PM), https://perma.cc/E2RK-68JT (discussing
the Virginia state legislature’s failed attempt to enact a per se standard for
prosecuting marijuana-impaired drivers).
276. Id.
277. H.B. 1182, 2006 Sess. (Va. 2006).
278. See DUI of Alcohol or Drugs; Offense Considered if Certain
Milligrams in Blood, H.B. 1182, 2006 Sess. (Va. 2006), https://perma.cc/8ZJRHJQR (listing the 98 members of the Virginia House of Delegates that voted
in favor of H.B. 1182 and noting that no members voted against the measure).
279. See Hausman, supra note 275 (noting that because the Senate never
voted on H.B. 1182, the bill failed).
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. See id. (quoting Tracci, who compared Colorado’s THC impairment
level of 5 nanograms per milliliter to the truck driver’s 6.6 nanogram per
milliliter result to illustrate what he believed was evidence of impairment).

HIGH TIME FOR CHANGE

161

evidence regarding the THC in the driver’s blood.283 The judge
based his exclusion of this evidence on the unreliability of the
scientific data linking THC to impairment.284 In response, Tracci
attempted to build support for a per se THC impairment
standard in Virginia.285
Thus far, Tracci’s efforts have proven unsuccessful, and
Virginia has not adopted a per se marijuana impairment
standard.286 However, in 2020, the Virginia legislature did adopt
a measure that prohibited searches based on the odor of
marijuana alone.287 Beyond that measure, neither the
legislature nor the Virginia Supreme Court have provided much
guidance regarding what constitutes probable cause in
instances of suspected marijuana-impairment. Virginia’s
limited case law—relative to a state like Massachusetts — may
be explained by the fact that marijuana was not decriminalized
in Virginia until 2020.288 While Massachusetts has been
grappling with questions regarding marijuana impairment and
probable cause since the state decriminalized the plant in

283. Id.
284. Id.
285. See id. (“[Tracci has] been lobbying lawmakers and working with the
association of commonwealth’s Attorneys and Mothers Against Drunk Driving
to build support for a measure that could come up in the next legislative
session.”).
286. See Cannabis in Virginia, supra note 270 (noting that Virginia does
not have per se marijuana DUI standard).
287. See VA. CODE ANN. § 4.1-1302(a) (2021)

No law-enforcement officer . . . may stop, search, or
seize any person, place, or thing and no search warrant
may be issued solely on the basis of the odor of
marijuana and no evidence discovered or obtained
pursuant to a violation of this subsection, including
evidence discovered or obtained with the person’s
consent, shall be admissible in any trial, hearing, or
other proceeding.
288. See Pendi, supra note 231 (“Democratic Governor Ralph Northam has
signed legislation . . . decriminalizing marijuana possession. The new
law . . . reduces penalties for offenses involving personal possession of up to
one ounce of marijuana to a civil violation—punishable by a maximum $25
fine, no arrest, and no criminal record.”).
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2008,289 Virginia is new to the arena.290 The unchartered
territory provides an opportunity for Virginia’s legislators and
judges to heed lessons from states that have already attempted
to resolve the issue.
V.

WHERE DO STATES GO FROM HERE?

The inability to reliably determine whether a driver is
impaired by marijuana is a problem that scientific advancement
will eventually solve. Dr. Haddon’s research, which culminated
in the 0.08 BAC standard, and the advent of the breathalyzer
made scientifically-sound alcohol impairment determinations a
reality.291 Ultimately, analogous breakthroughs will produce the
same result in the marijuana-impairment context. Promising
results have stemmed from studies that are currently
underway292 and additional funding for relevant scientific
research is crucial to realizing a lasting solution.293 These topics
are discussed below.294
In the meantime, states should not respond to these
scientific and technological limitations by imposing laws that
have the effect of criminalizing legal marijuana use. Currently,
scientific research does not support per se standards based on
THC-blood levels.295 States, like Washington, that have enacted
these standards should repeal the authorizing statute.296
Further, states should endeavor to protect drivers’ Fourth
Amendment rights by clearly indicating what constitutes
probable cause in instances of suspected marijuana impairment.
The lack of a reliable means of determining impairment is not
an excuse for relaxing protections against unjustified

289. See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
290. See Pendi, supra note 231 (discussing Virginia’s 2020
decriminalization of marijuana).
291. See supra Part 0.
292. See infra Part 0.
293. See infra Part 0.
294. See infra Parts 0–0.
295. See supra Part 0.
296. See infra Part 0. Currently six states—Colorado, Illinois, Montana,
Nevada, Ohio, and Washington— have per se THC standards for marijuana
impairment. GOVERNORS HIGHWAY SAFETY ASSOCIATION, MARIJUANA-RELATED
LAWS 1 (2021), https://perma.cc/7DK4-39YG.
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warrantless searches. Decisions by the Massachusetts SJC have
established some protections for individuals suspected of
driving under the influence of marijuana.297 While
Massachusetts can still do more to firmly define the parameters
of probable cause, it serves as a model for states like Virginia.
Having only recently legalized marijuana, Virginia should act
legislatively to provide probable cause-related protections like
and beyond those recognized by the Massachusetts SJC.298
Other states that have recently legalized marijuana or that plan
to decriminalize or legalize marijuana in the future should do
the same.
A. Scientific Research
Scientific research into roadside testing for marijuana
impairment is already underway.299 Yet despite this progress,
funding should continue to be allocated towards additional
research and technological development in this area.300
1.

Recent Developments

In a January 2022 study, researchers at Massachusetts
General Hospital (“MGH”) announced that they had developed
a “new, noninvasive technique for detecting marijuana highs.”301
The functional near-infrared spectroscopy (“fNIRS”) measures
“photon reflections from low-power LED bulbs mounted on a
skullcap and shined into the skull.”302 In the study, volunteers
were given either THC capsules or a placebo.303 The MGH
researchers then classified the volunteers as impaired or not
impaired based on a combination of self-reporting by the study
subjects and observations of clinicians.304 Subsequent brain

297. See supra Part 0.
298. See infra Part 0.
299. See infra Part 0.
300. See infra Part 0.
301. Dan Adams, MGH Claims Breakthrough in Detecting Marijuana
Impairment, BOS. GLOBE (Feb. 4, 2022, 4:55 PM), https://perma.cc/8QC6-DB55.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. See id. (describing how “multiple clinicians who were unaware of
which subjects had eaten the ‘real’ edible” reached a consensus regarding
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scans revealed that “people classified as impaired had
significantly higher levels of oxygenated hemoglobin” than both
those who ate the placebo or were not considered impaired.305 As
part of the study, MGH scientists also developed a computer
program that could detect the difference in oxygenated
hemoglobin between impaired and non-impaired subjects.306
The results of the study are crucial to pursuit of reliable
roadside testing for two reasons. First, the computer program
rarely indicated impairment in subjects who had consumed THC
edibles but were not deemed functionally impaired.307 Thus, it
seems that the technology could ultimately differentiate
between marijuana users that are fit to drive and those that are
not.308 Second, unlike the massive MRI machines that hospitals
use to conduct brain scans, fNIRS technology is relatively
portable.309 Thus, MGH researchers are optimistic that the
technology could be developed into a roadside device.310
2.

Funding Avenues

More funding should be appropriated for studies like the
one underway at MGH. Potential funding avenues include
government
research
programs
and
public-private
partnerships.
A government research program is a reliable source of
funding that has the potential to spur scientific development.
Appropriating funding through the Congressionally Directed
Medical Research Programs (“CDMRP”) is an attractive option.

which subjects were impaired through “thorough before-and-after observation
of [the subjects’] behavior”).
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. See id. (stating the technology is “far ahead of older methods that
automatically designate anyone with a high level of marijuana metabolites in
their system as impaired, regardless of how well they’re actually functioning”).
309. See id. (describing how fNIRS-like technology is already being used
in widely available smartwatches and fitness monitoring devices that measure
wearers’ heartrates and blood oxygenation).
310. See id. (stating that such a device “would allow police to catch
dangerously stoned drivers without sweeping up law-abiding cannabis
consumers and medical marijuana patients that have THC in their system but
are not actively impaired”).
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The CDMRP is a “Department of Defense (DOD) program that
receives congressional appropriations explicitly for biomedical
research in specific, congressionally identified health
matters.”311 Members of Congress request funding for medical
research during the annual defense appropriations process.312
The U.S. Army Medical Research and Development Command
then administers the appropriated funds through a competitive
grant process.313 Politically, seeking funding through a DOD
program increases the likelihood that the money will ultimately
be appropriated.314
Another means of obtaining funding for scientific research
is through a public-private partnership. The Driver Alcohol
Detection System for Safety (“DADSS”) Research Program could
serve as the model for a marijuana-equivalent partnership. The
DADSS “brings together the Automotive Coalition for Traffic
Safety (ACTS), which represents the world’s leading
automakers, and the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA).”315 Beginning in 2008, the program
has focused on research and creation of accurate, precise, and
reliable alcohol-impairment technology that would prevent
drunk drivers from being able to operate a vehicle.316 In
December 2021, the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles and
Schneider, a transportation and logistics company, announced
the first trial deployment of DADSS technology.317 In 2022, eight
311. Bryce H. P. Mendez, Cong. Rsch Serv., IF10349, Congressionally
Directed Medical Research Programs Funding for FY2021 1 (2021).
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. See The Military Spending Debate, CHARLES KOCH INST. (Jan. 30,
2019), https://perma.cc/8LM3-XS2S (discussing how both the Republican and
Democratic parties “enthusiastically” accommodate military spending).
315. See Alexander Stoklosa, Take a Shot of This: In-Car Drunkness
Detection Systems Being Tested by NHTSA, CAR & DRIVER (July 5, 2015),
https://perma.cc/G3ZW-2XJB (discussing the development of the DADSS
program’s in-car drunk-detection technology solutions).
316. See
DRIVER ALCOHOL DETECTION SYSTEM FOR SAFETY,
https://perma.cc/HTA2-DNF3 (articulating the DADSS program’s history and
purpose).
317. See Press Release, Driver Alcohol Detection System for Safety, The
Next Phase of Driven to Protect in Virginia (Dec. 8, 2021),
https://perma.cc/9J24-L4GZ (describing the trial program as a “new milestone
toward the commercialization of the DADSS technology and an important next
step in testing).
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Schneider trucks will be outfitted with DADSS’s newest breath
sensors.318 Each truck will log more than 100,000 miles during
the trial period, exposing the system to a wide range of new
drivers and environmental conditions.319 By helping to refine
the technology, the trial program is expected to bring DADSS
closer to its goal of “commercializing fully passive
vehicle-integrated breath technology.”320 Similar scientific and
technological progress could be achieved through public-private
partnerships devoted to marijuana impairment research.
B. Interim Legal Solutions
Scientific research into marijuana’s effects and the
development of reliable impairment indicators will take time. In
the interim, legal avenues must be pursued to protect drivers’
Fourth Amendment rights in the marijuana-impairment
context. Repeal of per se marijuana DUI laws as well as the
legislative enactment of probable cause-related protections are
important steps.
1.

Repeal Per Se Marijuana DUI Laws

Currently, six states have established a threshold limit for
the presence of THC.321 Like in Washington, drivers in Colorado,
Illinois, and Montana with a THC level of five nanograms per
milliliter of blood are per se guilty of a marijuana DUI.322 In
Nevada and Ohio, a driver is per se guilty of a marijuana DUI if
a blood test reveals a THC level above two nanograms per
milliliter.323
It is not surprising that states would adopt this per se
approach to addressing marijuana-impaired driving. Using the
well-established alcohol-impairment scheme as a model for
constructing a marijuana-impairment scheme seems inherently
logical. However, as Part III establishes, the science simply does

318.
319.
320.
321.

Id.
Id.
Id.
GOVERNORS HIGHWAY SAFETY ASSOCIATION, MARIJUANA-RELATED
LAWS 1 (2021), https://perma.cc/K5ZB-J2TS.
322. Id.
323. Id.
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not support this exercise in analogizing.324 The problem with
using an impairment threshold that is not scientifically-sound
is that it puts legal users of marijuana at risk of a DUI
conviction.
Consider the following series of events: a driver is pulled
over by a police officer for a minor traffic infraction. After the
officer approaches the vehicle, he becomes suspicious that the
driver may be impaired by marijuana. The officer’s suspicions
could be based on any number of observations, including the
driver’s behavior, the visible contents of the vehicle, or an
emanating odor of marijuana. However, these observations are
not necessarily indicative of impairment.325 Even if the driver
submits to FSTs at the officer’s request, the results of those
assessments are not a reliable indicator of impairment.326
At this stage of the traffic stop, the officer may decide to
search the vehicle for additional evidence of impairment. Citing
his observations as sufficient probable cause that the vehicle
contains evidence of illegality, the officer can proceed under the
automobile exception. In the vehicle, the officer may discover
marijuana or marijuana paraphernalia.327 In states where
marijuana is legal, there likely is nothing illegal about these
items’ presence in the vehicle. However, the presence of
marijuana combined with the officer’s prior observations may
lead the officer to arrest the driver. Having been arrested, the
driver is often forced to submit to a blood test. Refusal of a blood
test will typically result in a driver having his license suspended
328 and the refusal can also be used against the driver in a
criminal trial.329 If the driver submits to testing and the result
indicates his THC blood level is above the legal limit, the driver
324. See supra Part 0.
325. Further, in states where marijuana is legal, these observations are
not necessarily indicative of any criminal activity.
326. See supra Part 0.
327. The officer may discover that the car contains other illicit items. In
that instance, the warrantless search, which was initially based on
questionable showing of probable cause, could result in severe criminal
liability for the driver.
328. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 46.20.308(2)(a) (2019) (stating that
refusing a blood test will result in a driver’s license suspension for at least one
year).
329. See, e.g., id. § 46.20.308(2)(b) (“If the driver refuses to take the test,
the driver’s refusal to take the test may be used in a criminal trial . . . .”).
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is per se guilty. Accordingly, a driver that had legally used
marijuana and whose alleged impairment had not been proven
in a scientifically-sound manner, is guilty of a DUI. Per se
marijuana DUI statutes pose a significant risk to innocent
marijuana users who are not driving in violation of the law. This
result is not acceptable. In states where these per se THC
standards exist, the authorizing law must be repealed.
2.

Legislatively Enact Probable Cause-Related Protections

In all states where marijuana is legal, the lack of a reliable
means of determining marijuana impairment poses a risk to
drivers’ Fourth Amendment rights. Without an objective
impairment standard, police officers must amass a collection of
evidence to demonstrate that an individual was not fit to drive.
The incentive to conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle in
the pursuit of more definitive evidence of impairment is high. If
the standard for what constitutes sufficient probable cause to
initiate that warrantless search is unclear, then drivers are even
more vulnerable.
To protect drivers from unconstitutional searches in the
marijuana impairment context, states should establish
parameters for what does and does not amount to probable
cause. The Massachusetts SJC has recognized some protections
of this kind.330 Currently, Massachusetts case law dictates that
the presence of less than one ounce of marijuana in a vehicle
does not amount to probable cause.331 Additionally, neither poor
performance on FSTs nor the odor of marijuana alone is
sufficient evidence to support a warrantless search.332 However,
a police officer’s observations of the driver’s appearance and
behavior are.333 Through these holdings, the SJC has
demonstrated awareness regarding the scientific limitations
associated with determining marijuana impairment and has
fortified drivers’ Fourth Amendment rights.334
Other states should follow a similar course of action albeit
legislatively. Rather than waiting for motions to suppress
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.

See supra Part 0
See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 263, 265 and accompanying text.
See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 261–267 and accompanying text.
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evidence in marijuana DUI cases to make their way to the
state’s highest court, legislatures should be proactive. After
decriminalizing marijuana in 2020, Virginia took one important
step in this direction, enacting legislation that prohibited
searches based on the odor of marijuana alone.335 A similar law
should exist in all states where marijuana has been
decriminalized or legalized. Among states that have not yet, but
do ultimately decide to legalize marijuana, a similar provision
should accompany any legalization measure. Virginia, and other
similarly situated states, should also codify other protections
recognized by the Massachusetts SJC. Particularly important
are legislative prohibitions against finding probable cause based
solely on poor FST performance and the presence of legal
amounts of marijuana in a vehicle.
CONCLUSION
Throughout history, the law has often played a reactionary
role to scientific advancements and technological developments.
As new frontiers emerged, courts, legislatures, and legal
scholars have had to modernize old doctrines and create new
regulatory schemes. However, in the context of marijuana
impairment, it is legal progress that blazed the trail, leaving
scientific and technological innovation to follow in its wake.
The proliferation of marijuana legalization has provided
many Americans with access to marijuana. As it pertains to the
relationship between driving and marijuana use, legalization
has adjusted the permissible range of behaviors. While it
remains illegal to drive while impaired by marijuana, use of the
drug that does not result in impairment is not a bar to driving.336
The law recognizes this distinction, but science has not produced
a reliable way for law enforcement to make it.337
To identify a drunk driver, police officers rely on BAC
standards and FSTs specifically designed to test for alcohol
impairment.338 Yet, for determining marijuana impairment,
there is not a scientifically-sound BAC-equivalent standard and

335.
336.
337.
338.

VA. CODE ANN. § 4.1-1302(a) (2021).
See supra Part 0.
See supra Parts 0–0.
See supra Part 0.
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there are no roadside assessments on which police can rely.339
This scientific and technological void has problematic
consequences for marijuana users that get behind the wheel,
regardless of whether they are impaired.
In some states, legislators have ignored the science, opting
to impose per se marijuana DUI laws based on standards that
do not correlate with impairment.340 These laws threaten
innocent drivers, whose THC blood levels are above the legal
limit, but who are not impaired.341 For that reason, these laws
should be repealed.342
In all states, the lack of an established impairment
standard threatens drivers’ Fourth Amendment rights. The
inability to determine whether a driver is impaired during a
traffic stop creates an incentive to search the vehicle for
evidence of impairment.343 However, that incentive does not
equate to the probable cause sufficient to justify a warrantless
a search.344 Until science produces a reliable method for
determining marijuana impairment, states must protect
drivers’ Fourth Amendment rights in instances of suspected
marijuana DUIs.345 Ideally, these protections should take the
form of legislative enactments that firmly define the parameters
of probable cause in the marijuana impairment context.346

339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.

See supra Parts 0–0.
See supra Part 0.
See supra Part 0.
Id.
See supra Part 0.
Id.
See supra Part 0.
Id.

